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Judicial Takings in Vandevere v. Lloyd  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Vandevere v. Lloyd,1 the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split by 
changing its test for determining which property interests are 
protected under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. With the 
First Circuit applying federal constitutional law and the Ninth 
Circuit applying state law, the Ninth Circuit’s new test conflicts with 
Supreme Court precedents that the First Circuit follows.2 The Ninth 
Circuit in Vandevere considered whether some of Alaska’s 
regulations on commercial salmon fishing, which shortened fishing 
seasons, reduced fishing areas, and limited fishing for various salmon 
species, violated the Takings Clause.3 Commercial fishermen claimed 
that the regulations severely diminished the value of their entry 
permits by limiting the number of fish they could catch and sell.4 
Although claiming to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council 5 and its own decision in Schneider 
v. California Department of Corrections,6 the Ninth Circuit applied a 
new Takings Clause analysis in which “state law governs the 
demarcation of a property right, while federal law governs the 
manner in which the state must respect” that right.7 Deferring 
entirely to the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding in a nearly identical 
case,8 the Ninth Circuit then held that the fishermen’s entry permits 
were “not property for purposes of a takings claim.”9 
 
 
 1. Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 (2011). 
 2. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. (Schneider II), 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 3. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 959, 961–62. 
 4. Two types of permit-holding fishermen challenged the regulations: (1) fishermen 
who hold entry permits to use drift gillnets, and (2) fishermen who own leaseholds to 
submerged lands and hold entry permits to place set gillnets on those lands. Id. at 961. 
 5. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 6. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 966 (“In any event, Schneider is the law of our circuit and 
we are bound to follow it.” (citing Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 7. Id. at 964. 
 8. See Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283, 285 (Alaska 2008). 
 9. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 967. 
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This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit in Vandevere incorrectly 
applied both the Supreme Court’s Lucas line of cases and its own 
precedent in Schneider. The Ninth Circuit distorted existing Takings 
Clause analysis to produce a rule that conflicts not only with its own 
precedent and that of the First Circuit, but also with Supreme Court 
precedents. Additionally, the court’s failure to independently 
examine the nature and extent of rights that Alaska law created in 
entry permits effectively permitted a judicial taking of private 
property without just compensation.10 
Part II of this Note explains relevant legal principles for 
determining whether an interest is property for Takings Clause 
purposes by examining the regulatory-takings jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court, the First Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit. Part III 
describes the facts and procedural history of Vandevere. Part IV 
summarizes the court’s reasoning and decision in Vandevere. Part V 
analyzes Vandevere: first, it shows how the Ninth Circuit misapplied 
Lucas and Schneider; second, it demonstrates why the two elements 
in a proper Takings Clause inquiry logically and constitutionally 
cannot be hermetically sealed off from one another as separate 
inquiries without reaching absurd results; and third, it argues that 
the Vandevere rule facilitates judicial takings. Part VI concludes. 
II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND11 
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment,12 provides that private 
property must not “be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”13 A person cannot receive compensation for an 
 
 10. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2601–02 (2010) (plurality opinion) (recognizing existence of judicial taking of private 
property). 
 11. On December 1, 2011, this Note’s author emailed the fishermen’s attorney, Arthur 
S. Robinson, while the petition for certiorari was still pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Mr. Robinson’s paralegal responded: “You make reference to a note to be published.  Is there 
anything in that note that might help us in the reply we intend to send to the printer today?” 
This author gladly sent this Note in its first draft and was pleased to learn that substantial 
portions of his work were used in writing the Petitioners’ Reply Brief. Compare Petitioners’ 
Reply Brief at 4–7, Vandevere v. Lloyd, No. 11-455, 2011 WL 6069614, 2011 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 2466 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2011), with infra Parts II.A–C, IV.A.2, V.A–B, VI. 
 12. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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alleged taking, however, unless he has a “Takings Clause-recognized 
property interest.”14 This Part addresses how the Supreme Court, the 
First Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit have determined what qualifies 
as property for Takings Clause analysis. 
A. Supreme Court Precedents 
The Supreme Court has established two categories of per se 
takings that almost always require compensation: (1) regulations that 
cause a permanent physical invasion of the property and (2) 
regulations that deprive an owner of all beneficial use of the 
property.15 “Outside these two relatively narrow categories,” 
regulatory takings claims, such as when a regulation severely 
diminishes property values, are decided according to the principles 
found in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.16 
Additionally, a plurality of the Court has recognized the possibility 
of a judicial taking of private property.17 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, the Supreme Court 
held that a state regulation depriving a landowner of all beneficial use 
of his property amounted to a taking without just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment.18 The state could avoid compensation 
only by pointing to “background principles” of nuisance and 
property law allowing the regulatory diminution in the land’s value.19 
Following Lucas, courts and scholars debated the meaning of 
background principles, and whether these principles included “(1) 
statutory law, as opposed to just common law; (2) recently enacted 
law, as opposed to just vintage law rooted in age-old legal tradition; 
and (3) federal law, as opposed to just state law.”20 One scholar has 




 14. Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
307, 317 (2007). 
 15. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538. 
 16. Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). 
 17. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2602 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 18. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 19. Id. at 1029. 
 20. Meltz, supra note 14, at 353. 
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view is incorrect because it ignores Lucas’ explicit mention of the 
federal navigation servitude.”21 
In its Penn Central-type cases, the Court has recognized various 
factors for determining whether one has a property interest and 
whether state regulations have effected a taking. Some of these 
factors include the regulation’s “economic effect” on the person, 
“the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
government action.”22 However, the Court has also stated that 
“property is more than economic value; it also consists of ‘the group 
of rights which the so-called owner exercises in his dominion of the 
physical thing,’ such ‘as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.’”23 
And in a principal case relied on by the Ninth Circuit, Justice Souter 
stated the following: 
It thus makes good sense to consider what is property only in 
connection with what is a compensable taking, an approach to Fifth 
Amendment analysis that . . . would . . . reduce the risk of placing 
such undue emphasis on the existence of a generalized property 
right as to distort the taking and compensation analyses that 
necessarily follow before the Fifth Amendment’s significance can be 
known.24 
For judicial takings, a plurality of the Court suggested that the 
inquiry “is not whether there is precedent for the allegedly 
confiscatory decision, but whether the property right allegedly taken 
was established” under state law.25 This is because independent 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)). 
 23. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998) (citations omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 380 (1945)). 
 24. Id. at 175 (Souter, J., dissenting); cf. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 470, 482–83 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that although 
“the inquiry as to what property interest is taken by the condemnor and the inquiry as to how 
that property interest shall be valued are not identical ones, they cannot be divorced without 
seriously undermining a number of rules dealing with the law of eminent domain”). 
 25. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2610 (2010) (plurality opinion); see Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial 
Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 367–68 (2012) (proposing as elements for 
judicial-takings test “(1) the government’s intention to appropriate the property for a public 
purpose, (2) the involvement of repeat players in the state-court proceedings giving rise to the 
complaint about judicial appropriation, (3) whether the government retains the property in 
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sources, such as state law, are the basis for the “existing rules or 
understandings” that create and define property interests by securing 
certain benefits and supporting “claims of entitlement to those 
benefits.”26 It should remain clear, however, that “the meaning of 
‘property’ as used in the Fifth Amendment [is] a federal question,” 
despite “obtain[ing] its content by reference to local law.”27 
Furthermore, the plurality stated that federal courts can enforce the 
Takings Clause only if “they have the power to decide what property 
rights exist under state law,” thus allowing them to review 
judgments of state supreme courts.28 In sum, Supreme Court 
precedents suggest that the property inquiry is very fact specific and 
often requires considering various sources of law. 
B. First Circuit Precedent 
The First Circuit’s Takings Clause analysis follows Supreme 
Court precedent. In its 1990 opinion in Hoffman v. City of 
Warwick,29 the First Circuit considered whether veterans who 
challenged Rhode Island’s repeal of a statute that granted “enhanced 
seniority in employment for returning war veterans”30 had a 
constitutionally protected property interest for a takings claim. When 
the federal district court discovered that the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court had a similar case pending before it, the district court stayed 
the veterans’ case until the state court had entered its decision.31 The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court subsequently held that the repealed 
statute “merely created gratuities or floating expectancies,” and that 
the veterans had no vested property interest in enhanced seniority 




question for a public use, and (4) the existence of any coordination between the judiciary and 
another branch”). 
 26. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 27. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (quoting United States v. 
Powell, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2609. 
 29. Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 30. Id. at 611. 
 31. Id. at 613. 
 32. Id. at 613–14 (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 641 (R.I. 1987)). 
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Though it dismissed the case on other grounds, the First Circuit 
rejected the notion that it was bound by the decision of the state 
supreme court. The court stated that the mere fact that state law 
creates the property interest does not necessarily mean that “the state 
has the final say as to whether that interest is a property right for 
federal constitutional purposes.”33 The court concluded that “federal 
constitutional law determines whether the interest created by the 
state rises to the level of ‘property,’ entitled to the various 
protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”34 Thus, 
twenty years before the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Stop the 
Beach, the First Circuit asserted its authority to decide whether state-
created interests are protected by the federal Takings Clause. 
C. Ninth Circuit Precedents 
Before Vandevere v. Lloyd, the Ninth Circuit’s Takings Clause 
analysis was consistent with First Circuit and Supreme Court 
precedents. While purporting to rely on its 1998 decision in 
Schneider v. California Department of Corrections, the Ninth Circuit 
in Vandevere omitted significant, essential portions of that case.35 In 
Schneider, prison inmates challenged a policy based on California 
Penal Code section 5808, which directed the State to deposit in a 
communal-welfare account all interest earned on individual “Inmate 
Trust Accounts” (“ITA”) while each prisoner-beneficiary was 
incarcerated.36 The prisoners argued that by not paying to each 
inmate the interest earned on his ITA, the State effected “a taking of 
private property for public purposes.”37 The district court dismissed 
the challenge—relying both on section 5808 and the lack of a 
provision “allowing or requiring the Director of Corrections to pay 
interest earned from funds in an ITA to an inmate”38—and 
concluded that California law did not specifically create a positive 
property right to the interest earned on a prisoner’s ITA.39 
 
 33. Id. at 615. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 36. Id. at 1195–96. 
 37. Id. at 1196. 
 38. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. (Schneider I), 957 F. Supp. 1145, 1147–48 (N.D. 
Cal. 1997), rev'd, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) 
 39. Id. at 1148–49. 
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The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, disagreeing that the 
California statute was controlling. The court held that California 
prisoners did “possess a constitutionally [protected] property interest 
that trigger[ed] Takings Clause scrutiny.”40 In analyzing the takings 
claim, the court noted that California law, besides creating no 
property right to the interest earned on an ITA, appeared to reject 
that any property interest existed at all.41 But the fact that positive 
state law either failed to create or expressly denied the existence of a 
property interest did not end the Takings Clause inquiry.42 Citing 
two Supreme Court cases,43 the Ninth Circuit asserted that 
“property rights can—and often do—exist despite statutes . . . that 
appear to deny their existence.”44 The court went on to establish 
several guiding principles for determining what property rights are 
protected: 
[T]here is . . . a “core” notion of constitutionally protected 
property into which state regulation simply may not intrude 
without prompting Takings Clause scrutiny. The States’ power vis-
a-vis property thus operates as a one-way ratchet of sorts: States 
may . . . confer “new property” status on interests located outside 
the core of constitutionally protected property, but they may not 




 40. Schneider II, 151 F.3d at 1201. Just three months before Vandevere was decided, 
the First Circuit in Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011), rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Schneider, concluding that since inmates held fewer property rights than others at 
common law, and no state case law suggested a right for inmates to receive earned-interest 
income on their personal accounts, inmates did not have a constitutionally protected property 
interest. Id. at 53–54. Interestingly, retired Associate Justice David Souter sat by designation 
on the First Circuit panel in Young. Justice Souter’s dissent in Phillips—that the first prong, 
whether an individual has a protected property interest, should never be separated from the 
second prong, whether a compensable taking has occurred—addresses many concerns that later 
occurred as a result of the holdings in Schneider and in Vandevere. See supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
 41. Schneider II, 151 F.3d at 1199. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). 
 44. Schneider II, 151 F.3d at 1199. 
 45. Id. at 1200–01 (footnote omitted). 
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The court explained that “the core of constitutionally protected 
property” is defined “by reference to traditional ‘background 
principles’ of property law.”46 Considering a right to earned-interest 
income as within the “core” of constitutionally protected property, 
the court rejected the California statute and instead rested its 
holding on the common-law rule that “interest follows principal.”47 
The Ninth Circuit has also rejected the view that a state’s 
appellate- and supreme-court decisions are binding—solely because 
they classify an interest as a “privilege”—when determining what is 
property for federal-law purposes. In Little v. United States, the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether a taxpayer’s statutory right to 
redeem property by paying outstanding property taxes to the state 
constituted a property interest to which federal-tax liens could 
attach.48 In arguing that his statutory right of redemption was not 
“property or rights to property,” the taxpayer cited three California 
cases holding that the right of redemption was “nothing more than a 
personal privilege granted by statute.”49 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
this argument, stating that “[s]imply because an interest is classified 
as a ‘privilege’ under state law” does not end the inquiry.50 Rather, 
the proper inquiry is whether under state law the interest is “an 
economic asset in the sense that it has pecuniary worth and is 
transferable, so that a claim can be enforced against it.”51 The court 
then held that the taxpayer’s interest—a right of redemption—was “a 
valuable right to property.”52 
And in 2010, the Ninth Circuit in Ward v. Ryan reiterated the 
view expressed in Schneider—that certain property rights are so 
fundamental that “even if a statute does not explicitly create a 
property interest, such right may nonetheless still exist.”53 
 
 46. Id. at 1201 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 
(1992)). 
 47. Id. at 1200 (“The Webb’s and Phillips decisions are therefore similar to one another 
(and germane to this case) in a critical respect: In both cases, the Court relied, in the face of a 
contrary state statute, upon the traditional common law rule that ‘interest follows principal’ in 
recognizing a protected property interest in earned interest income.”). 
 48. Little v. United States, 704 F.2d 1100, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 49. Id. at 1106. 
 50. Id. (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. at 1105–06 (footnote omitted). 
 52. Id. at 1106. 
 53. Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2010). 
CLEMENTS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012 11:33 AM 
423 Judicial Takings in Vandevere v. Lloyd 
 431 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Facts of the Case 
Since about 1978, Dyer Vandevere, John McCombs, Gary 
Hollier, and John Jent (collectively “fishermen” or “Vandevere 
plaintiffs”) have held permanent-entry permits to commercially fish 
for salmon in Alaska’s Upper Cook Inlet.54 Two of the fishermen 
hold permits to fish with drift gillnets, and the other two fishermen 
hold permits to place set gillnets on submerged lands where they are 
leaseholders.55 Entry permits are valuable assets that are transferable, 
and the Commission has no authority to revoke them.56 As long as 
the fishermen renew their entry permits at least every two years,57 the 
permits carry many rights and benefits as property under Alaska law: 
entry permits can be transferred and sold inter vivos;58 devised by 
will, passed by right of survivorship, inherited through intestacy, and 
exempted from creditors’ claims against the estate;59 executed against 
for past-due child-support payments;60 treated as premarital property 
in divorce proceedings;61 used to recover tort damages for another’s 
actions that decrease their value;62 and pledged as security for certain 
loans.63 
The Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 
(“Commission”) “regulates entry into [Alaska’s] commercial 
fisheries.”64 In 1996, the Commission began enacting regulations 
that drastically shortened the drift-gillnet season to run only from 
June 25 to August 9—shortening the season by seventy-five 
percent.65 
 
 54. Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 (2011). 
 55. Id. at 961. 
 56. Id. at 966. 
 57. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(c)–(d) (2010). 
 58. Id. § 16.43.170. 
 59. Id. § 16.43.150(h). 
 60. Anderson v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 320, 323–24 (Alaska 1987). 
 61. See Edelman v. Edelman, 3 P.3d 348, 351 (Alaska 2000). 
 62. See Edelman v. Edelman, 61 P.3d 1, 4 (Alaska 2002). 
 63. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.10.333–.338, 44.81.215, .225, 44.81.231–.250; see also 
Brief of Appellants at 17, Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35957). 
 64. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 960 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.100(a)(1)). 
 65. Id. at 961–62. Between 1980 and 1996, the fishing seasons were 190 days each year 
(June 25 to December 31). Id. Since 1996, the fishing seasons have been only forty-six days 
 
CLEMENTS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012 11:33 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
432 
B. Procedural History 
In May 2007, the fishermen sued the Commission and sought an 
injunction to prevent further enforcement of the new regulations.66 
The fishermen claimed that the Commission’s regulations effected a 
taking of their property;67 the shortened fishing seasons severely 
limited the number of fish that the fishermen could catch and sell, 
which directly diminished the value of their fishing permits.68 The 
district court granted the Commission’s motion for summary 
judgment, providing little to no separate analysis.69 Instead, relying 
on the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding in Vanek v. State70—a nearly 
identical case—the district court held that the fishermen “lack[ed] a 
property interest in their entry permits” and that “they had not 
suffered a due process violation.”71 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed without dissent the district 
court’s summary-judgment ruling against the fishermen. The Ninth 
Circuit approached the Takings Clause analysis by breaking down 
the inquiry into two separate steps. First, the fishermen were 
required to show that their entry permits gave them a property 
interest.72 Whether the entry permits created a property right was a 
state-law question.73 Second, the court would determine whether a 
regulatory taking without compensation had occurred, which was a 
federal-law question.74 But the court would not turn to the second 
 
each year (June 25 to August 9). Id. 
 66. Id. at 961. 
 67. The fishermen also claimed a due-process violation because there was inadequate 
notice and opportunity to be heard when the regulations were passed. Id. at 969. Additionally, 
the two fishermen who held leaseholds to submerged lands made a takings claim. Id. at 963. 
Because these claims were dismissed on different rationales, they are beyond the scope of the 
circuit split and of this Note. 
 68. Id. at 962. 
 69. Id. at 963. 
 70. Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2008). 
 71. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 963. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 964. 
 74. Id. at 963–64 (“As to a question of federal law, including this one, we owe no 
deference to state courts.”). 
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step unless the fishermen could show that they had a constitutionally 
protected property interest.75 Having determined that it was required 
to follow the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Vanek v. State,76 
the Ninth Circuit held that the fishermen’s entry permits were “not 
property for purposes of a takings claim.”77 Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the “second step of a full takings analysis” was 
unnecessary.78 
A. Two-Step Takings Clause Analysis 
According to the Ninth Circuit, this two-step, state–federal 
dichotomous approach to a takings analysis was recognized by the 
Supreme Court, “albeit obliquely, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council.”79 First, the Ninth Circuit looked to Lucas’s disposition and 
reasoned that because the Supreme Court’s disagreement with the 
state supreme court was unrelated to “the extent of the property 
interest in the . . . land,” the posture of the remand order seemed to 
“firmly suggest[]” that property interests are determined by state 
law.80 Second, the Supreme Court’s decision expressly focused on 
how far a state regulation could permissibly invade private property 
without paying just compensation, which was a question of federal 
law.81 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the disposition in 
Lucas82 appeared to indirectly suggest that “state law governs the 
demarcation of a property right, while federal law governs the 
manner in which the state must respect” that right.83 
 
 75. Id. at 963. 
 76. Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2008). 
 77. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 967. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 964 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)). 
 80. Id. (second emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Notably, the Ninth Circuit also pointed to a procedural-due-process case in which 
the Supreme Court first had found that several utility customers’ property rights were 
“definitively established by decisions of the state courts,” and then had answered the federal 
question whether the utility company had provided its customers sufficient due process before 
turning off their utility services. Id. (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 
U.S. 1, 9, 12 (1978)). 
 83. Id. 
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1. State—but sometimes federal—law defines property rights 
Having established some footing for its takings analysis, “albeit 
obliquely,” the Ninth Circuit garnered more evidence showing that 
its approach was not novel (at least for state-created licenses) by 
pointing to Schneider v. California Department of Corrections.84 The 
court explained that in Schneider, it had distinguished between “old 
property” and “new property” rights.85 Regarding old property, 
“which includes the more traditional forms of property based in the 
common law”—such as the right to keep earned interest on one’s 
principal funds—the Vandevere court seemed to imply that “federal 
courts applying the [C]onstitution make the final call.”86 For new 
property, which includes nontraditional property rights—such as 
welfare entitlements, public employment, and state-created contracts 
and licenses—state law effectively “can curtail or limit it with little 
constitutional interference”87 because “state law has the final say on 
what interests one possesses.”88 
2. Circuit split between Schneider and Hoffman 
The court felt there was an apparent “tension between [its] 
analysis in Schneider and the First Circuit’s Takings Clause analysis in 
Hoffman v. City of Warwick,” but the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
its own precedent was superior for three reasons.89 First, the court 
found Schneider to be more faithful to the two-step analysis it 
recognized as implicit in Lucas.90 By contrast, Hoffman condensed 
the analysis into a single inquiry in which “federal courts, guided by 
their own precedents, decide both” steps, rather than the second step 
alone.91 Second, the court found that it made more sense to apply 
 
 84. Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 85. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 965. 
 86. Robert H. Thomas, Recent Developments in Regulatory Takings Law: What Counts 
as “Property?”, 34 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., no. 9, Oct. 2011, at 5, available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/71176492/Thomas-Recent-Developments-in-Regulatory-
Takings-Law-What-Counts-as-Property-34-Zoning-Planning-Law-Report-Oct-2011. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 965. 
 89. Id. (citing Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 90. Id. at 966. 
 91. Id. 
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state law to decide whether entry permits were property, while 
Hoffman indicated that state law did not have the “final say” in that 
regard.92 Third, the court found that principles of stare decisis 
mandated that it follow Schneider and not Hoffman.93 
B. Deference to the Alaska Supreme Court 
Alaska state law had spawned the “creature” at issue—entry 
permits—and the Ninth Circuit found that it was powerless to 
consider the extent or existence of any property interest independent 
of “a relevant decision by the state’s highest court.”94 Three years 
before, the Alaska Supreme Court had held in Vanek v. State that 
fishers’ entry permits were not property interests for takings-analysis 
purposes.95 The Ninth Circuit conducted a brief analysis, limited to 
determining whether Vanek was dispositive on the entry-permit 
issue. The court summarized the Vanek plaintiffs’ arguments, noting 
that the “Vanek plaintiffs’ arguments . . . echoed the arguments that 
Plaintiffs advance here.”96 
The Vanek plaintiffs argued that their entry permits had all the 
characteristics of property: an entry permit was economically valuable 
and transferable; was entitled to due-process protection; could serve 
as collateral to secure a loan; could be devised by will or inherited by 
right of survivorship; was property or a right to property for federal-
 
 92. Id. (“It would be anomalous to conclude that, in the absence of a statutory or 
contractual provision for compensation, the state must compensate those regulated when the 
state regulates an interest that the state itself created in the first place and explicitly made 
subject to future regulation.”). 
 93. Id. (“In any event, Schneider is the law of our circuit and we are bound to follow 
it.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (citing Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283, 285, 288 (Alaska 2008)). 
 96. Id. (citing Vanek, 193 P.3d at 285). At first glance, the court’s reasoning for 
summarizing the Vanek plaintiffs’ arguments and not the Vandevere plaintiffs’ arguments 
might seem perfectly logical. But this maneuver is particularly problematic for two reasons. 
First, in accepting the Vandevere plaintiffs’ appeal, the court essentially agreed to give the 
fishermen their day in court—deciding their case on its merits. But the court failed to give the 
Vandevere plaintiffs these courtesies by categorically lumping their arguments with those of the 
Vanek plaintiffs. The court merely recited the Alaska Supreme Court’s analysis without 
conducting any real analysis of its own. Second, and more troubling, the Vandevere plaintiffs 
advanced myriad, distinct arguments that were never considered by the Ninth Circuit (and 
certainly were not considered by the state supreme court). See Brief of Appellants at 10–30, 
Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35957). 
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tax-lien purposes; and was “subject to execution for past due child 
support claims.”97 Additionally, the Board of Fisheries had no power 
to revoke, suspend, or modify entry permits.98 The State’s argument, 
which the Alaska Supreme Court ultimately accepted, was that 
permit holders had “nothing more than a use privilege or license to 
fish, subject to all applicable regulations adopted by the board of 
Fisheries.”99 
The Ninth Circuit zeroed in on four factors supporting the 
Alaska Supreme Court’s decision. First, an Alaska statute specifically 
provided that “[a]n entry permit constitutes a use privilege that may 
be modified or revoked by the legislature without compensation.”100 
Thus, the plain language of the statute denied the existence of a 
compensable property interest.101 Second, a 1979 Attorney General 
Opinion stated that legislative enactments affecting the nature of 
entry permits would not require just compensation because entry 
permits “ha[d] not acquired the status of a property right.”102 Third, 
a student-written law-review article stated that the Alaska Senate in 
1990 had rejected the notion that entry permits conferred any 
property right.103 “Finally, the [state] court examined at length its 
own precedents and the effect of state constitutional provisions that 
reserve fish to the people for common use and ban exclusive rights in 
fisheries.”104 
Relying on the Alaska Supreme Court’s opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit held that entry permits were not property for takings-claim 
purposes; step two in the Takings Clause analysis was therefore 
unnecessary.105 
 
 97. Vanek, 193 P.3d at 288–89, 291, 293. 
 98. Id. at 288. 
 99. Id. 
 100. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(e) (2011). 
 101. Vanek, 193 P.3d at 289 (“The legislature’s ‘use privilege’ language establishes that 
the permits are merely licenses to fish that are subject to government regulation.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 289 & n.21 (citing Jon David Weiss, Note, A Taxing Issue: Are Limited Entry 
Fishing Permits Property?, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 96, 112 (1992)). 
 104. Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 966–67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 
(2011) (citations omitted). 
 105. Id. at 967. As noted before, the Ninth Circuit also disposed of the claims of the two 
fishermen who held shore-fishery leases. The court first recited a few relevant sections from the 
fishermen’s boilerplate lease agreements—contracts that all fishery leaseholders were required 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Takings Clause analysis should not be divided into two separate 
bodies of law—state law to determine property interests and federal 
law to determine whether a compensable taking occurred. Likewise, 
it is “wrong to separate Takings Clause analysis of the property rights 
at stake from analysis of the alleged deprivation.”106 The two prongs 
are bound up together as a mixed question of state and federal law. 
The Ninth Circuit created this anomalous, two-step rule only after 
incorrectly applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council.107 And by deferring to the Alaska Supreme 
Court, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider on its own the nature and 
extent of the benefits and rights that entry-permit holders enjoyed 
under Alaska law. This is problematic because, as the Ninth Circuit 
previously recognized in Schneider v. California Department of 
Corrections, property rights can—and often do—exist despite state 
laws denying their existence.108 If the Ninth Circuit had properly 
applied Schneider’s analysis, it would have recognized that entry 
permits confer a large bundle of rights identical to the rights that 
people get “when they obtain title to property.”109 
A. Lucas Does Not Firmly Suggest a Two-Step Inquiry 
The Supreme Court in Lucas never suggested—not even 
“obliquely”—that two separate analyses should be conducted to 
determine whether a state has effected a regulatory taking.110 
Relatedly, and despite the Ninth Circuit’s claim otherwise, the 
Court’s remand order in Lucas does not “suggest[] that state law 
 
to sign. Then the court concluded that the “lease plainly exempts regulatory takings of the 
kind challenged here from the requirement that Plaintiffs receive just compensation.” Id. at 
969. While the Alaska Supreme Court had held that fishery leaseholders of submerged land 
had a “limited property interest,” id. at 967, the Ninth Circuit did not address the fishermen’s 
takings claim but held that the fishermen had “contractually waived their right to challenge the 
regulations when they signed their lease agreements.” Id. at 969. 
 106. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 180 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 107. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 966 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992)). 
 108. Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 109. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
 110. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 964 (stating that the Supreme Court recognized a two-step, 
state–federal law approach to a Takings Clause analysis, “albeit obliquely,” in Lucas). 
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governs the demarcation of a property right.”111 Rather, the Court’s 
remand order expressly required that South Carolina (if it wanted to 
avoid paying compensation) justify its prohibition on Lucas’s desired 
use—building a home—by reference to state common-law principles 
of property and nuisance.112 This is exactly what the State “would be 
required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action 
for public nuisance.”113 In other words, the State’s reliance on new 
legislative findings alone was insufficient to justify its confiscatory 
regulation, which prevented “all economically beneficial use of 
land.”114 Additionally, the Court answered the question whether any 
background principle of property law or nuisance law existed to 
justify the prohibition: building a home was an “essential” land use 
that was unlikely to have been prohibited by common-law 
principles.115 Thus, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, 
Lucas stands for the view that a state’s statutory law is limited—not 
empowered—in its ability to define away property rights.116 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning—that Lucas’s remand 
order had nothing to do with the extent of the property interest and 
thus was evidence that state law controlled—is a non-sequitur.117 
Logically speaking, the argument is invalid because it denies the 
antecedent, taking the following form: If (A), then (B). (Not-A). 
So, (not-B). To make sense of how the court’s reasoning is faulty, 
one must supply the implicit premises, (A) and (B), because the 
court’s argument made explicit only the contrapositives, (Not-A) 




 111. Id. 
 112. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1029. 
 115. Id. at 1031 (“It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented 
the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on [Lucas’s] land; they rarely 
support prohibition of the ‘essential use’ of land.” (citation omitted)). 
 116. Id. at 1029–30. 
 117. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 964 (“[T]he Court’s quarrel with the state supreme court 
did not concern the extent of the property interest in the beachfront land, which the Court’s 
remand order firmly suggests is a matter of state law but, rather, concerned the extent to which 
the state could invade a property interest without providing just compensation, which is a 
matter of federal law.”). 
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If (A) Lucas’s remand order concerned the extent of the property 
interest, then (B) the extent of the property interest is not a matter 
of state law. (Not-A) Lucas’s remand order “did not concern the 
extent of the property interest.” So, (not-B) “the extent of the 
property interest” “is a matter of state law.”118 
Practically speaking, however, even if the court’s argument were 
valid, it would still miss the point. The Supreme Court made evident 
the extent of Lucas’s property interest,“a fee simple interest,” which 
was “an estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law” 
and clearly not unique to the state’s statutory law.119 The Supreme 
Court did suggest, however, that property interests could be 
identified in future cases by looking to how a state’s property laws 
have shaped “the owner’s reasonable expectations.”120 Put another 
way, courts should ask “whether and to what degree the State’s law 
has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular 
interest.”121 Thus, while correctly looking to principles of state law to 
identify the fishermen’s property interests, the Ninth Circuit 
incorrectly halted its inquiry after a cursory examination revealed a 
single statutory provision and a state-supreme-court decision that 
were seemingly controlling.  
B. Takings Analysis: Mixed Question of State Law and Federal Law 
The Ninth Circuit’s mischaracterization of Lucas effectively 
ended the inquiry. If federal courts refuse to consider on their own 
“what is property” by looking to the legal recognitions and 
protections given an interest under state law, states can continue to 
legislate away property rights and thereby escape the Takings Clause 
inquiry altogether. If every court were to take that approach, it 
would always end the inquiry. 
Fifth Amendment claims of uncompensated takings no doubt 
present mixed questions of state law and federal law. For the 
Constitution itself does not create property rights; rather, 
“independent source[s]”—such as state law, common law, and 
 
 118. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 119. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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federal law—confer property rights.122 Because the Constitution 
protects property interests that various sources of law confer on 
individuals, the first prong of the Takings Clause analysis is 
necessarily bound up with second prong. Thus, while a state’s 
common law or statutory law might be the source of a property 
right, the total inquiry is whether there has been an unconstitutional 
taking of that right. It therefore makes little sense to divorce the two 
prongs when they are naturally bound up as a single constitutional 
question. 
The Alaska Supreme Court’s determination that entry permits 
are not property for Takings Clause purposes is equivalent to a 
determination that there has not been an uncompensated taking. 
Because the takings inquiry is a constitutional question, the Ninth 
Circuit owed no deference to the state supreme court. As one 
professor has argued: 
[T]he nature of the federal courts’ authority to enforce the Takings 
Clause with respect to state-created property rights dictates that 
they have the jurisdiction to review final state court judgments that 
purportedly eliminate established property rights and to decide 
what property rights existed under state law [before] the challenged 
decision.123 
If this were not the case—if federal courts were truly powerless to 
consider how an interest is treated under state law without deferring 
to a relevant decision of the state’s supreme court—the state 
judiciary would be granted unlimited discretion to violate the 
Takings Clause. 
Yet the Ninth Circuit in Vandevere erroneously deferred entirely 
to the analysis and holding of the Alaska Supreme Court on this 
mixed question of constitutional law. Only one Alaska statute 
actually states that entry permits are “use privileges,” while 
numerous other statutes and decisions by the Alaska Supreme Court 
give entry permits heightened protections and recognize them as 
 
 122. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 123. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Legal Castles in the Sand: The Evolution of Property 
Law, Culture, and Ecology in Coastal Lands, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213, 225 (2011) (citing 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2608–10 
(2010)). 
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property interests.124 And as the Ninth Circuit has recognized in its 
prior cases, once a state applies its “one-way ratchet” to confer new 
property status on nontraditional interests, the state cannot then 
declare that the interest was never property to begin with simply by 
classifying it as a “privilege.”125 Alaska conferred new property status 
on entry permits by making them, among other things, transferable, 
nonrevocable, inheritable by right of survivorship, devisable by will, 
subject to execution for past-due child-support payments, and usable 
as collateral to secure a loan.126 Alaska could not then declare that 
entry permits were never property to begin with simply by pointing 
to the statutory language classifying them as a “use privilege.” 
C. The Vandevere Test Facilitates Judicial Takings 
The Vandevere court’s deference to the Alaska Supreme Court’s 
judicial taking is contrary both to Supreme Court precedent and, 
ironically, to the court’s own declaration that it would not so defer. 
The Vandevere court seemingly adopted the plurality view in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection.127 The plurality argued that an actor from any branch of 
government, including the judiciary, could effect a taking:128 “It 
would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the 
Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”129 The Vandevere 
court echoed this same view in an extended footnote: 
[A]ny branch of state government could . . . effect a taking. We 
also note that a federal court remains free to conclude that a state 
supreme court’s purported definition of a property right really 
amounts to a subterfuge for removing a pre-existing, state-
recognized property right. That is, we need not take a state court at 
its word as to the kind of analysis that it is performing.130 
 
 124. See supra Part III.A and sources cited notes 56–63. 
 125. See Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1998); Little v. United States, 
704 F.2d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 126. See supra Part III.A, notes 56–63, Part IV.B, notes 97–98. 
 127. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2592. 
 128. Id. at 2602 (plurality opinion). 
 129. Id. at 2601. 
 130. Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 964 n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 
(2011) (citations omitted). 
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But the court gave only lip service to this idea. The Alaska 
Supreme Court had recharacterized entry permits—treated under 
Alaska law as property or rights to property in at least nine different 
ways—by essentially concluding that entry permits were generally 
treated as property interests except for purposes of the Takings 
Clause.131 And the Vandevere court did precisely what it vowed not 
to do: it took a state court at its word and deferred to the state 
court’s analysis.132 The court blindly followed the Alaska Supreme 
Court’s decision to effect a judicial taking of private property 
without compensation. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit created a new 
rule that facilitates judicial takings—giving state supreme courts 
almost-exclusive discretion to determine which property interests are 
constitutionally protected.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the Ninth Circuit purported to follow precedent, its 
decision in Vandevere v. Lloyd breaks from precedent and creates a 
circuit split. The court’s prior approach in Schneider did not actually 
conflict with the First Circuit’s analysis in Hoffman v. City of 
Warwick. In fact, Vandevere diverges from both Schneider and Lucas 
to create a Takings Clause analysis that gives states nearly complete 
discretion to decide whether property interests are protected by the 
U.S. Constitution. 
The Ninth Circuit should have accurately applied its Takings 
Clause analysis from Schneider and asserted its power to review 
decisions of a state supreme court. The court should have held that 
the Alaska Supreme Court’s purported definition of entry permits 
“really amount[ed] to a subterfuge for removing a pre-existing, 
state-recognized property right.”133 Instead, the court ratified the 
state court’s judicial taking when it declared that entry permits are 
not property interests. 
 
 
 131. Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283, 292–94 (Alaska 2008). 
 132. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 967 (“On this question of state law, which is the same as the 
first question that we face here, we must follow Vanek. Therefore, in reliance on this recent 
opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court, we hold that Plaintiffs’ entry permits are not property 
for purposes of a takings claim.”). 
 133. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 964 n.4. 
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This Note has shown by reductio ad absurdum134 that the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis in Vandevere is logically inconsistent and stands as 
proof that its test leads to an absurd result: it “allow[s] a State to do 
by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by 
legislative fiat.”135 Thus, Vandevere should be overruled. 
While the issue presented to the Ninth Circuit was undoubtedly 
difficult, the court has an ever-present duty to apply federal-
constitutional principles to vindicate private-property rights—
particularly when state actions improperly define away by legislation, 
invade by regulation, or destroy by judicial declaration the 
individual’s Fifth Amendment right to just compensation. 




















 134. Latin for “reduction to the absurd,” reductio ad absurdum is a “method of proving 
the falsity of a premise by showing that its logical consequence is absurd or contradictory.” 
Reductio ad absurdum, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
reductio+ad+absurdum (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). 
 135. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2601 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
  J.D. candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
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